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Administrative	Inconsistency	in	the	Courts		
	
Stephen	Daly		
Dickson	Poon	School	of	Law,	King’s	College	London	
	
Joe	Tomlinson	
Dickson	Poon	School	of	Law,	King’s	College	London;	Public	Law	Project	
	
1. The	 recent	Supreme	Court	 case	of	R	 (Gallaher	Group	Ltd)	 v.	Competition	and	Markets	
Authority	 [2018]	 UKSC	 25,	 [2018]	 2	 WLR	 1583	 considered	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	
treatment	and	its	application	to	the	conduct	of	the	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	
(“CMA”)	in	a	dispute	over	price-fixing	in	the	tobacco	market.	Elsewhere	in	this	 issue	of	
Judicial	Review,	there	is	a	comprehensive	treatment	of	the	doctrinal	components	of	the	
case.1	In	this	note,	we	consider	two	points	in	the	judgment	that	we	suggest	are	cause	for	
wider	 reflection	by	administrative	 lawyers.	 First,	 the	nature	of	 the	exercise	of	 “tidying	
up”	 the	 grounds	 of	 judicial	 review	 undertaken	 by	 Lord	 Carnwath	 and,	 second,	 Lord	
Sumption’s	 discussion	 of	 “wider	 duties”	 attaching	 to	 public	 authorities	 “charged	with	
enforcing	the	law”	(para.	46).		
	
2. The	dispute	considered	 in	Gallaher	 resulted	from	an	 investigation	by	the	Office	of	Fair	
Trading	 (“OFT”)	 into	 alleged	 price-fixing	 in	 the	 tobacco	 market	 (the	 OFT	 was	
subsequently	 replaced	by	 the	CMA).	As	 Lord	Sumption	 recognised,	 such	 investigations	
are	“notoriously	difficult	without	inside	information	or	the	active	co-operation	of	at	least	
one	 participant	 and	 are	 not	 necessarily	 straightforward	 even	 then”	 (para.	 46).	 In	 this	
context,	 Early	 Resolution	 Agreements	 (“ERAs”)	 are	 often	 used	 to	 settle	 disputes	 by	
consent	quickly,	with	the	party	under	investigation	benefitting	from	a	reduced	penalty.	
As	 an	 administrative	 tool,	 ERAs	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 “enable	 an	 investigation	 to	 be	
conducted	 expeditiously,	 economically	 and	 fairly”	 (para.	 46).	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	
investigation	 considered	 in	Gallaher,	multiple	 parties	 entered	 into	 ERAs	with	 the	OFT,	
with	 the	parties	admitting	 fault	 and	benefiting	 from	 lesser	penalties.	One	provision	of	
the	ERA	was	that	the	parties	could	pursue	an	appeal	(though	if	that	option	was	taken,	
the	 OFT	 would	 increase	 the	 fine	 and	 pursue	 costs).	 One	 party	 –	 TM	 Retail	 (TMR)	 –	
enquired	during	the	course	of	 the	 investigation	as	to	whether	 it	could	benefit	–	 in	the	
sense	 of	 a	 refund	 along	with	 a	 contribution	 to	 costs	 and	 interest	 –	 from	 a	 successful	
appeal	by	one	of	the	other	parties.	Due	to	an	official	error,	TMR	were	assured	this	would	
be	the	case.	Subsequently,	some	of	the	other	parties	successfully	appealed	and	the	OFT	
honoured	its	assurance	to	TMR.	This	resulted	however	in	another	group	of	parties	who	
were	 subject	 to	ERAs,	but	who	did	not	appeal	and	were	not	given	 such	an	assurance,	
feeling	 hard	 done	 by.	 The	 refusal	 of	 the	 CMA	 to	 replicate	 their	 assurances	 direct	
																																								 																				
1	[Citation	required	for	other	article	in	issue].	
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elsewhere	in	favour	of	this	group	was	the	subject	of	the	challenge	in	Gallaher,	where	the	
Supreme	Court	ultimately	 found	 the	CMA’s	approach	 to	be	 lawful.2	 Though	 the	group	
received	 different	 treatment	 to	 TMR,	 this	was	 said	 to	 be	 justified	 for	 several	 reasons	
(para	44	(Lord	Carnwath);	para	56	(Lord	Sumption);	para	63	(Lord	Briggs)).	First,	it	was	a	
mistake	in	the	first	place	to	give	the	assurance	to	TMR	who,	second,	had	the	assurance	
been	rescinded,	would	have	likely	succeeded	in	convincing	a	court	to	hear	an	appeal	out	
of	time	and	would	have	succeeded	on	the	substantive	argument	given	the	precedence	
set	by	the	other	appeal.	Third,	the	group	had	not	lobbied	for	the	same	assurance	as	TMR	
had	in	2008.	
	
3. In	 his	 judgment,	 Lord	 Carnwath	 spent	 some	 time	 “tidying	 up”	 the	 language	 used	 to	
articulate	 the	 grounds	 in	Gallaher.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	 treatment,	 he	
held	that	it	is	not	a	free-standing	principle	of	administrative	law	but	a	claim	derived	from	
existing	grounds	such	as	rationality	(para.	24):	
	
Whatever	the	position	in	European	law	or	under	other	constitutions	or	jurisdictions,	the	domestic	
law	of	 this	 country	does	not	 recognise	equal	 treatment	as	a	distinct	principle	of	administrative	
law.	Consistency,	as	Lord	Bingham	said	 in	 [R	(O’Brien)	v	 Independent	Assessor	 [2007]	2	AC	312,	
para	30],	is	a	“generally	desirable”	objective,	but	not	an	absolute	rule.		
	
Lord	 Carnwath	 also	 commented	 on	 the	 use	 of	 broad	 concepts	 such	 as	 “fairness”	 in	
administrative	 law:	 “[f]airness,	 like	 equal	 treatment,	 can	 readily	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
fundamental	 principle	 of	 democratic	 society;	 but	 not	 necessarily	 one	 directly	
translatable	 into	 a	 justiciable	 rule	 of	 law”	 (para.	 31).	 The	 cases	 on	 fairness	 show,	 he	
suggested,	“how	misleading	it	can	be	to	take	out	of	context	a	single	expression,	such	as	
“conspicuous	unfairness,”	and	attempt	to	elevate	it	into	a	free-standing	principle	of	law”	
(para.	 40).	 In	 all	 of	 the	 cases	 reviewed	 in	 the	 judgment,	 there	 was	 a	 ground	 —	
“unfairness,”	 “conspicuous	 unfairness”	 or	 “abuse	 of	 power”	 —	 which	 described	 the	
conclusion	reached	by	the	judge	(para.	37).	The	implication	here	is	that	cases	should	no	
longer	be	argued	solely	in	the	language	of	abuse	of	power	or	conspicuous	unfairness	but	
rather	 must	 be	 anchored	 to	 an	 established	 ground	 for	 review–such	 as	 rationality	 or	
legitimate	 expectation.	 In	 support	 of	 Lord	 Carnwath’s	 analysis,	 Lord	 Sumption	 agreed	
that	(para.	50):	
	
In	public	law,	as	in	most	other	areas	of	law,	it	is	important	not	unnecessarily	to	multiply	categories.	It	
tends	to	undermine	the	coherence	of	the	law	by	generating	a	mass	of	disparate	special	rules	distinct	
from	those	applying	in	public	law	generally	or	those	which	apply	to	neighbouring	categories.	
	
																																								 																				
2	Contrary	to	the	Court	of	Appeal,	see:	Gallaher	Group	Ltd	v.	Competition	and	Markets	Authority	[2016]	EWCA	
Civ	719,	[2016]	Bus	LR	1200.	
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Lord	Sumption	concluded	that,	while	there	is	a	“common	law	principle	of	equality,”	it	is	
still	 “usually	 no	 more	 than	 a	 particular	 application	 of	 the	 ordinary	 requirement	 of	
rationality	imposed	on	public	authorities”	(para.	50).	
	
4. All	of	these	remarks	are	about	the	form,	and	language,	that	ought	to	be	used	to	express	
the	grounds	of	judicial	review.	As	has	been	argued	elsewhere,	“language	plays	a	useful	
descriptive	 role	 in	administrative	 law,	setting	out	a	 landscape	 that	can	be	comfortably	
viewed	and	usefully	discussed	from	20,000	feet.”3	Recent	decades	have	seen	traditional	
language	frameworks	in	administrative	law	replaced	and	supplemented	by	more	“open-
textured”	 terms	 such	 as	 “fairness.”4	 For	 some,	 the	 contemporary	 language	 of	 judicial	
review	is	an	unruly	mess	and	there	is	a	need	to	tidy	it	up;	to	get	rid	of	concepts	that	are	
simply	clutter	and	to	organise	properly	those	that	have	value.	For	others,	messiness	is	a	
palatable	 part	 of	 a	 pragmatic	 approach	 to	 judicial	 review.5	 Gallaher	 can,	 at	 least	
superficially,	 appear	 to	 be	 the	 restoration	 of	 a	 more	 clear-cut	 approach	 to	 grounds.	
What	is	more	important	however	is	the	extent	to	which	the	judicial	function	is	changing	
as	the	language	of	administrative	law	changes.		
	
5. The	 relationship	between	 legal	 language	and	 judicial	 function	 is	 a	 complex	one.	 It	has	
often	 been	 the	 case	 that	 changes	 in	 language	 have	 corresponded	 with	 changes	 in	
function.	Equally,	however,	 language	can	change	but	actual	function	can	change	little.6	
The	key	point	here	is	that	changing	language	in	judgments	is	only	a	reliable	indicator	of	a	
changing	judicial	function	to	a	certain	extent,	and	it	is	certainly	not	a	perfect	measure.7	
It	is	difficult	to	see	the	ruling	in	Gallaher	as	changing	the	judicial	function	in	any	serious	
way.	This	was	common	ground	 in	the	 judgment	(paras.	26,	40	and	41	(Lord	Carnwath)	
and	para.	50	(Lord	Sumption)).	Indeed,	the	restoration	of	the	“ordinary”	judicial	review	
grounds	 and	 the	maintenance	 of	 the	 contemporary	 judicial	 function	 can	 take	 us	 to	 a	
place	 where,	 although	 the	 language	 appears	 simpler,	 the	 retained	 concepts	 become	
more	flexible	and	ambiguous.8	That	state	of	affairs—and	that	seems	to	be	what	Gallaher	
moves	 us	 towards—would	 cut	 across	 many	 of	 the	 key	 rationales	 of	 clarity	 and	 legal	
																																								 																				
3	Paul	Daly,	"The	Language	of	Administrative	Law"	(2016)	94	Canadian	Bar	Review	519,	p.522.	
4	Ibid.	
5	For	instance,	contrast	the	approaches	to	substantive	legitimate	expectations	in:	Jason	Varuhas,	“In	Search	of	
a	Doctrine:	Mapping	the	Law	of	Legitimate	Expectations”	in	Matthew	Groves	and	Greg	Weeks	(eds)	Legitimate	
Expectations	 in	 the	Common	 Law	World	 (Hart,	 2016);	 Joe	Tomlinson,	 “The	Narrow	Approach	 to	 Substantive	
Legitimate	Expectations	and	 the	Trend	of	Modern	Authority”	 (2017)	17(1)	Oxford	University	Commonwealth	
Law	Journal	75.	
6	Which	may	 result	 in	 what	 Chintan	 Chandrachud,	 writing	 in	 the	 context	 of	 judicial	 review	 in	 India,	 labels	
“fictitious”	doctrines,	 see:	 “The	 (Fictitious)	Doctrine	of	 Legitimate	 Expectations	 in	 India”	 in	Matthew	Groves	
and	Greg	Weeks	(eds)	Legitimate	Expectations	in	the	Common	Law	World	(Hart,	2016).	
7	See	for	instance:	Dan	Simon	and	Nicholas	Scurich,	“Judicial	Overstating”	(2013)	88	Chicago-Kent	Law	Review	
411.	
8	Jeffrey	Jowell	and	Anthony	Lester	“Beyond	Wednesbury:	Substantive	Principles	in	Administrative	Law”	[1987]	
Public	Law	368.	
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certainty	 put	 forward	 by	 those	 who	 would	 prefer	 restoration	 of	 a	 more	 clear-cut	
approach	to	grounds.9	
	
6. Beyond	 Lord	Carnwath’s	 attempt	 at	 “tidying	 up”	 the	 grounds	 of	 review,	Gallaher	also	
saw	three	brief	 concurring	 judgments	and	amongst	 them	was	an	 interesting	comment	
from	Lord	Sumption.	In	relation	to	the	CMA,	he	stated	that	a	“competition	authority	is	
not	 an	 ordinary	 litigant,	 but	 a	 public	 authority	 charged	 with	 enforcing	 the	 law.	 It	
therefore	has	wider	responsibilities	than	the	extraction	of	the	maximum	of	penalties	for	
the	minimum	of	effort”	(para.	46).	He	continued	by	offering	some	examples:	“[a]	party	
under	investigation	must	not	be	subjected	to	undue	pressure	to	make	admissions.	Nor	
can	it	be	deprived	of	any	statutory	right	of	appeal	against	the	ultimate	decision”	(para.	
46).	 There	 are,	 at	 least,	 two	 interesting	 dimensions	 to	 this	 obiter	 comment	 which	
warrant	further	reflection.	
	
7. First,	 this	 statement	 adds	 nuance	 to	 rulings	 directed	 at	 other,	 similar	 administrative	
bodies.	 In	 particular,	 in	 several	 significant	 tax	 cases,	 where	 at	 issue	 was	 the	 use	 of	
HMRC’s	 managerial	 discretion,10	 the	 courts	 have	 affirmed	 that	 HMRC	 may	 use	 its	
discretion	to	collect	the	maximum	amount	of	tax	due	having	regard	to	resources.11	That	
has	been	taken	at	times	by	HMRC	to	be	the	guiding	principle	as	to	how	the	managerial	
discretion	ought	to	be	exercised.12	Lord	Sumption’s	statement	adds	an	important	 layer	
of	 nuance	 not	 explicit	 in	 the	 previous	 tax	 cases.	 Specifically,	 that	 public	 authorities	
may	make	 decisions	which	 seek	 to	maximise	 revenue	 having	 regard	 to	 resources,	 but	
that	is	not	a	statement	of	a	rule,	and	hence	a	demarcation	of	the	limits	of	its	overarching	
discretion.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 an	example	of	 a	 rational	 use	 of	 discretion	 in	 particular	
circumstances.	 Thus,	 a	 public	 authority	 should	 not	always	use	 its	 powers	 to	maximise	
certain	outcomes	as	it	has	“wider	responsibilities”	(para.	46).		
	
8. The	distinction	that	Lord	Sumption	is	trying	to	draw	by	 identifying	the	CMA	as	“not	an	
ordinary	 litigant”	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 it	 is	 “charged	 with	 enforcing	 the	 law”	 is,	 however,	
																																								 																				
9	 For	 comments	 along	 these	 lines	 in	 relation	 to	Gallaher,	 see:	Mark	 Elliott,	 “Consistency	 as	 a	 free-standing	
principle	 of	 administrative	 law?”	 (15	 June	 2018),	 available	 at:	
<https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2018/06/15/the-supreme-courts-judgment-in-gallaher-consistency-as-a-
free-standing-principle-of-administrative-law/>	accessed	19	August	2018.	
10	The	discretion	is	derived	from	Commissioners	for	Revenue	and	Customs	Act	2005,	s.	5	which	provides	that	
HMRC	is	responsible	for	the	collection	and	management	of	taxes	and	credits.	
11	 IRC	v.	National	Federation	of	Self-Employed	and	Small	Businesses	Ltd	 [1982]	AC	617,	626	(Lord	Diplock),	R	
(Wilkinson)	 v.	 IRC	 [2005]	 UKHL	 30,	 para	 21	 (Lord	 Hoffmann);	 [2006]	 STC	 270,	 and	 R	 (Davies)	 v.	 HMRC;	 R	
(Gaines-Cooper)	v.	HMRC	[2011]	UKSC	47,	[2012]	1	All	ER	1048,	para	26	(Lord	Wilson).	
12	 See	 for	 instance	 HMRC,	 Resolving	 tax	 disputes:	 Commentary	 on	 the	 litigation	 and	 settlement	 strategy	
(October	2017)	[8],	[16]	and	[17].	HMRC,	ADML1300	Incorrect	Advice	to	Customers:	When	incorrect	advice	can	
be	 binding	 (July	 2016),	 available	 at:	 <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/admin-law-
manual/adml1300>	 accessed	 19	 August	 2018;	 HMRC,	 ADML	 4300	 Extra-statutory	 concessions:	 Deciding	
whether	 an	 extra-statutory	 concession	 can	 be	 made	 (July	 2016),	 available	 at:	 <https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-
internal-manuals/admin-law-manual/adml4300>	accessed	19	August	2018.	
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unclear.	On	one	 reading,	 Lord	Sumption	 is	 contrasting	private	citizens	at	 litigants	with	
public	 authorities	 as	 litigants.	 This	 is	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 general	 reminder	 of	 the	
existence	 of	 well-established	 administrative	 law	 principles.	 On	 another	 reading,	
however,	Lord	Sumption	could	be	understood	to	be	identifying	the	CMA	as	belonging	to	
a	 special	 category	 of	 public	 authority	 that	 are	 “charged	with	 enforcing	 the	 law.”	 This	
latter	reading	can	be	supported	by	how	the	examples	of	duties	he	offers	seem	to	relate	
to	what	the	CMA	does,	e.g.	a	“party	under	investigation	must	not	be	subjected	to	undue	
pressure	to	make	admissions”	(para.	46).	If	this	reading	is	correct	and	Lord	Sumption	is	
suggesting	particular	“wider	responsibilities”	attach	to	public	bodies	similar	to	the	CMA,	
this	is	a	more	(if	not	entirely)	novel	claim.	
	
9. Every	administrative	authority	is,	at	least	in	principle,	a	law	enforcement	body.	At	a	very	
basic	 level,	 it	 is	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 administration’s	 task	 to	 implement	 laws	 passed	 by	
Parliament.	 It	 would	 be	 somewhat	 confusing	 therefore	 for	 Lord	 Sumption	 to	 use	 the	
idea	of	the	CMA	having	the	job	of	“enforcing	the	law”	to	ground	his	claim	that	the	CMA	
belongs	 to	 a	 particular	 class	 of	 public	 body.	 Potentially,	 the	 distinction	 is	 seeking	 to	
identify	 a	 category	 of	 public	 bodies	which	 take	punitive	 action	 (e.g.	 the	 imposition	 of	
penalties)	 and	 to	 which	 certain	 responsibilities	 would	 attach	 (this	 reading	 seems	 to	
correlate	with	the	examples	of	the	duties	he	supplies).	However,	 this	suggestion	could	
have	 very	 far	 reaching	 implications	 indeed.	 Take,	 for	 instance,	 the	 inherently	 punitive	
exercise	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Department	 for	 Work	 and	 Pensions	 when	 they	 impose	
benefit	 sanctions.13	 If	 the	common	 law	 is	 to	 impose	particular	duties	vis-à-vis	punitive	
administrative	 action,	 surely	 those	duties	may	 extend	 to	 areas	 of	 government	 activity	
such	 as	 the	 benefit	 sanctioning	 regime	 too?	 There	 is	 some	 history	 of	 the	 courts	
developing	 particular	 common	 law	 standards	 in	 relation	 to	 punitive	 administrative	
action.14	Lord	Sumption	has	also	alluded	previously,	 in	Bank	Mellat	v	HM	Treasury	 (No	
2)	[2013]	 UKSC	 39	 (para.	 83),	 to	 the	 existence	 a	 principle	 which	 “has	 roots	 in	 the	
common	law…	where	administrative	acts	of	an	oppressive	or	penal	character	have	been	
quashed	 as	 being	 disproportionate.”	 Yet	 there	 has	 never	 been	 properly	 developed	
common	law	jurisprudence	on	the	“wider	responsibilities”	which	may	attach	to	punitive	
administrative	action.	 If	 one	 is	 to	be	developed,	 and	preferably	before,	 the	 significant	
implications	and	scope	of	such	reasoning	for	both	the	courts’	role	and	administration’s	
functioning	must	be	thought	out	clearly.	
																																								 																				
13	Michael	Adler,	Cruel,	 Inhuman	or	Degrading	Treatment?	Benefit	 Sanctions	 in	 the	UK	 (Palgrave	Macmillan,	
London	2018).	
14	See	e.g.	R	v.	Barnsley	Metropolitan	Borough	Council	ex	p	Hook	[1976]	1	WLR	1052.		
